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We determine optimal monetary policy under commitment in a forwardlooking New 
Keynesian model when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. The lower bound 
represents an occasionally binding constraint that causes the model and optimal policy to be 
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of U.S. mark-up shocks seems too small to entail zero nominal interest rates, shocks affecting 
the natural real interest rate plausibly lead to a binding lower bound. Under optimal policy, 
however, this occurs quite infrequently and does not require targeting a positive average rate 
of inflation. Interestingly, the presence of binding real rate shocks alters the policy response to 
(non-binding) mark-up shocks. 
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New Keynesian 1 Introduction
In the recent past nominal interest rates in major world economies have
reached historically low levels and in some cases have gone all the way down
to zero.1 Such a situation is generally deemed problematic as the inabil-
ity to further lower nominal interest rates can lead to higher than desired
real interest rates. In particular, it is often feared that if agents hold de-
ﬂationary expectations the economy might embark on a deﬂationary path,
often referred to as a ‘liquidity trap’, with high real interest rates generating
demand shortfalls and thereby fulﬁlling the expectations of falling prices.
This paper studies optimal monetary policy under commitment taking
explicitly into account that nominal interest rates cannot be set to negative
values.2 We consider a well-known monetary policy model with monopolistic
competition and sticky prices, as described in Clarida, Galí and Gertler
(1999) and Woodford (2003). While this model has been widely used to
study optimal monetary policy and short-run ﬂuctuations, we are the ﬁrst
to solve it in a fully stochastic setup that directly takes into account the
zero lower bound.
In a stochastic economy the lower bound on interest rates will occa-
sionally be binding, since shocks may drive the economy into a situation
where it would be better for monetary policy to set nominal rates below
zero. This feature aggravates the solution of the policy problem but allows
us to calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and to assess the quantitative
1At April 30, 2004 the U.S. federal funds rate stood at 1%, the uncollateralized
overnight call rate in Japan was at 0,001%, and the minimum bid rate of the European
Central Bank was at 2%.
2In principle negative nominal rates are feasible, e.g., if one is willing to give up free
convertability of deposits and other ﬁnancial assets into cash or if one could levy a tax on
money holdings, see Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003) and Goodfriend (2000). However,
there seems to be no general consensus on the applicability of such policy measures.
1implications of the zero lower bound. In particular, we can ask how optimal
monetary policy should be conducted when interest rates are only slightly
positive and there is the possibility of reaching the lower bound in the fu-
ture. This is especially relevant in the current era of low inﬂation and low
nominal interest rates, that characterize major world economies.
Besides addressing substantive economic questions, this paper also im-
plements a new approach to numerically solving nonlinear optimal policy
problems with forward-looking constraints that might be of wider inter-
est. In particular, we use results from the theory of recursive contracts, see
Marcet and Marimon (1998), and determine optimal policy by solving for
the functional ﬁxed point of a generalized Bellman equation.3 This solution
method is complementary to the approach of Marcet and DenHaan (1990)
and Christiano and Fisher (2000), which is based on solving a system of
ﬁrst order conditions, but it has the paramount advantage that one can
numerically verify whether second order conditions actually hold.
Two qualitatively new features of optimal policy emerge from our anal-
ysis.
First, we ﬁnd that nominal interest rates may have to be lowered more
aggressively in response to shocks than what is instead suggested by a model
without lower bound. Such ‘preemptive’ easing of nominal rates is optimal
because agents anticipate the possibility of binding shocks in the future and
reduce already today their output and inﬂation expectations correspond-
ingly.4 Such expectations end up amplifying the adverse eﬀects of shocks
and thereby trigger a stronger policy response.
3To our knowledge we are the ﬁrst to solve for the saddle point function solving the
generalized Bellman equation.
4Expectations are reduced because once the lower bound is reached inﬂation and output
become negative.
2Second, the presence of shocks that cause the zero lower bound to bind
alters also the optimal policy reaction to non-binding shocks. This occurs
because the policymaker cannot aﬀect the average real interest rate in any
stationary equilibrium, therefore, faces a ‘global’ policy constraint. The
inability to lower nominal and real interest rates as much as desired requires
that optimal policy increases rates less (or lowers rates more) in response to
non-binding shocks, compared to the policy that would instead be optimal
in the absence of the lower bound.
There are also a number of quantitative results regarding optimal mon-
etary policy for the U.S. economy emerging from this analysis.
First, the zero lower bound appears inessential in dealing with mark-up
shocks, i.e., variations over time in the degree of monopolistic competition
between ﬁrms.5 More precisely, the empirical magnitude of mark-up shocks
observable in the U.S. economy for the period 1983-2002 is too small for the
zero-lower bound to become binding. This would remain the case even if the
true variance of mark-up shocks were threefold above our estimated value.
Second, the shocks to the ‘natural’ real rate of interest may cause the
lower bound to become binding, but this happens relatively infrequently and
is a feature of optimal policy.6 Based on our estimates for the 1983-2002
period, in the U.S. economy the bound would be expected to bind on average
one quarter every 17 years under optimal policy.7 Once zero nominal interest
rates are observed they are expected to endure on average not more than
1 to 2 quarters. Moreover, the average welfare losses entailed by the zero
lower bound seem to be rather small.
5These shocks are sometimes called ‘cost-push’ shocks, e.g., Clarida et al. (1999).
6The natural real rate is the real interest rate associated with the optimal use of
productive resources under ﬂexible prices.
7Under sub-optimal policy this might occur more or less frequently.
3The latter results, however, are sensitive to the size of the standard
deviation of the estimated natural real rate process. In particular, we ﬁnd
that zero nominal rates would occur much more frequently and generate
higher welfare losses if the real rate process had a somewhat larger variance.
Third, as argued by Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2001) and Eggerts-
son and Woodford (2003) optimal policy reacts to a binding zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates by generating inﬂationary expectations in the form
of a commitment to let future output gaps and inﬂation rates increase above
zero. The policymaker thereby eﬀectively lowers the real interest rates that
agents are confronted with.
Since reducing real rates using inﬂation is costly (in welfare terms), the
policymaker has to trade-oﬀ the welfare losses generated by too high real
rates with those stemming from higher inﬂation rates. We ﬁnd that the
required levels of inﬂation and the associated positive output gap are very
moderate. A negative 3 standard deviation shock to the natural real rate
requires a promise of an increase in the annual inﬂation rate in the order of
15 basis points and a positive output gap of roughly 0.5%.
Finally, while the optimal policy response to shocks through the promise
of above average output and inﬂation may in principal generate a ‘commit-
ment bias’, the quantitative eﬀects turn out to be negligible. This holds not
only for our baseline calibration but also for a range of alternative model
parameterizations that we look at. It suggests that optimal policy for the
U.S. economy implements an average inﬂa t i o nr a t eo fz e r oe v e nw h e nt a k i n g
directly into account the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.8
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy
8Zero inﬂation is optimal because it minimizes the price dispersion between ﬁrms with
sticky prices and we abstract from the money demand distortions associated with positive
nominal interest rates.
4discusses the related literature. Thereafter, section 3 introduces the model
and the policy problem. Section 4 presents our calibration for the U.S.
economy. The solution method we employ is described in section 5. Section
6 presents our main results on the optimal monetary policy with lower bound
for the U.S. economy. We then discuss in section 7 the robustness of our
ﬁndings to various parameter changes, and brieﬂy conclude in section 8.
2 Related Literature
A number of recent papers study the implications of the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates for optimal monetary policy.
Most closely related is Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) who consider
a perfect foresight economy and analytically derive optimal targeting rules
with a lower bound. In this paper we consider instead a fully stochastic setup
which requires to solve the model numerically. Only with this stochastic
setup one can assess how policy should be conducted in the ‘run-up’ to a
binding situation, where shocks may drive the economy from a non-binding
state into a binding one. In addition, we can calibrate the model to the U.S.
economy and study the quantitative importance of the zero lower bound for
the conduct of monetary policy in practice.
A related set of papers focuses on optimal monetary policy in the ab-
sence of credibility. In a companion paper of ours, Adam and Billi (2003),
we derive the nonlinear optimal policy under discretionary policy making.
Eggertsson (2003) analyzes discretionary policy and the role of nominal debt
policy as an instrument to achieve credibility.
The performance of simple monetary policy rules is examined by Fuhrer
and Madigan (1997), Wolman (2003), and Coenen, Orphanides and Wieland
(2004). A main ﬁnding of this set of papers is that if the targeted inﬂa-
5tion rate is close enough to zero, simple policy rules formulated in terms
of inﬂation rates, e.g., the Taylor rule (1993), can generate signiﬁcant real
distortions. Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and Wolman (2003) show
that simple policy rules formulated in terms of a price level target can sig-
niﬁcantly reduce these real distortions associated with the zero lower bound
on interest rates. Benhabib et al. (2002) study the global properties of
Taylor-type rules showing that these might lead to self-fulﬁlling deﬂation
that converges to a low inﬂation or deﬂationary steady state. Evans and
Honkapohja (2003) study the properties of global Taylor rules under adap-
tive learning, showing the existence of an additional steady state with even
lower inﬂation rates.
The role of the exchange rate and monetary-base rules in overcoming the
adverse eﬀects of a binding lower bound on interest rates is analyzed, e.g.,
by Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003), Coenen and Wieland (2003), McCallum
(2003), and Svensson (2003).9
3 The Monetary Policy Problem
We consider a simple and well-known monetary policy model of a represen-
tative consumer and ﬁrms in monopolistic competition facing restrictions
on the frequency of price adjustments (Calvo (1983)). Following Rotemberg
(1987), this is often referred to as the ‘New Keynesian’ model, that has fre-
quently been studied in the literature, e.g., Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999)
and Woodford (2003).
We augment this otherwise standard monetary policy model by explicitly
imposing the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. We thus consider
9Further articles dealing with the relevance of the zero lower bound can be found in
the special issues of the Journal of Japanese and International Economies Vol. 14, 2000
and the Journal of Money Credit and Banking Vol. 32 (4,2), 2000.
6the following problem:
max
{yt,πt,it}
−E0
∞ X
t=0
βt ¡
π2
t + αy2
t
¢
(1)
s.t.:
πt = βEtπt+1 + λyt + ut (2)
yt = Etyt+1 − ϕ(it − Etπt+1)+gt (3)
it ≥− r∗ (4)
ut = ρuut−1 + εu,t (5)
gt = ρggt−1 + εg,t (6)
u0, g0 given (7)
where πt denotes the inﬂation rate, yt the output gap, and it the nominal
interest rate expressed as deviation from the interest rate consistent with
the zero inﬂation steady state.
The monetary policy objective (1) is a quadratic approximation to the
utility of the representative household, where the weight α > 0 depends
on the underlying preference and technology parameters. Equation (2)
is a forward-looking Phillips curve summarizing, up to ﬁrst order, proﬁt-
maximizing price setting behavior by ﬁrms, where β ∈ (0,1) denotes the
discount factor and λ > 0 depends on the underlying utility and technology
parameters. Equation (3) is a linearized Euler equation summarizing house-
holds’ intertemporal maximization, where ϕ > 0 denotes the interest rate
elasticity of output. The shock gt captures the variation in the ‘natural’ real
interest rate and is usually referred to as a real rate shock, i.e.,
gt = ϕ(rt − r∗) (8)
where the natural real rate rt is the real interest rate consistent with the
ﬂexible price equilibrium and r∗ =1 /β−1 i st h er e a lr a t eo ft h ed e t e r m i n i s t i c
7zero inﬂation steady state.10 The requirement that nominal interest rates
have to remain positive is captured by constraint (4). Finally, Equations
(5) and (6) describe the evolution of the shocks, where ρj ∈ (−1,1) and
εj,t ∼ iiN(0,σ2
j) for j = u,g.11
3.1 Discussion
3.1.1 Relation to earlier work
The new feature of our policy problem, outlined in the previous section, is
the presence of the lower bound (4) and the shocks εu,t and εg,t. These ele-
ments together cause the policy problem to become nonlinear. The problem
without lower bound has been studied, e.g., by Clarida, Galí and Gertler
(1999) and Woodford (2003). The problem with lower bound and perfect
foresight (εu,t = εg,t =0 ) has been analyzed in Jung, Teranishi, and Watan-
abe (2001) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).12
3.1.2 Policy instruments
It should be stressed that the interest rate is here assumed to be the only
available policy instrument. We thereby abstract from a number of alter-
native policy instruments that might be important in a situation of zero
nominal interest rates, most notably ﬁscal policy, exchange rate policy, and
quantity-based monetary policies. Our setup, thus, tends to give prominence
if not overemphasize the policy implications of the zero nominal interest rate
10The shock gt summarizes all shocks that under ﬂexible prices generate time variation
in the real interest rate, therefore, it captures the combined eﬀects of preference shocks,
productivity shocks, and exogenous changes in government expenditure.
11As shown subsequently, this speciﬁcation of the shock processes is suﬃciently general
to describe the historical sequence of shocks in the U.S. economy for the period 1983:1-
2002:4 that we consider.
12Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) also consider a simple stochastic setup with an ab-
sorbing non-binding state.
8bound.
While the omission of ﬁscal policies clearly constitutes a shortcoming
that ought to be addressed in future work, ignoring exchange rate and money
policies may be less severe than one might initially think.
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2001), e.g., show that one can reinterpret the
present setup as an open economy model and that there exists a one-to-
one mapping between interest rate policies and exchange rate policies. It
is then inessential whether policy is formulated in terms of interest rates or
exchange rates.
Similarly, ignoring quantity-oriented monetary policies in the form of
open market operations during periods of zero nominal interest rates seems
to be of little relevance. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show that in the
present model such policies have no eﬀect on the equilibrium unless they
inﬂuence the future path of interest rates.
We recognize that alternative policy instruments may still be relevant
in practice.13 Focusing on interest rate policy in isolation is nevertheless of
interest, since it allows to assess what interest rate policy alone can achieve
in avoiding liquidity traps and whether there is any need for employing
other instruments. This seems important to know, given that alternative
instruments are often subject to (potentially uncertain) political approval
by external authorities and may therefore not be readily available.
3.1.3 How much non-linearity?
Instead of the fully nonlinear model, we study linear approximations to
ﬁrms’ and households’ ﬁrst order conditions, i.e., equations (2) and (3),
13See Eggertsson (2003) on how other policy instruments, e.g., nominal debt policy, may
be used as a commitment device.
9respectively, and a quadratic approximation to the objective function, i.e.,
equation (1). This means that the only nonlinearity that we take account
of is the one imposed by the zero lower bound (4).14
Clearly, this modelling approach has advantages and disadvantages. One
disadvantage is that for the empirically relevant shock support and the esti-
mated value of the discount factor the linearizations (2) and (3) may perform
poorly at the lower bound. Yet, this depends on the degree of nonlinearity
present in the economy, an issue about which relatively little is empirically
known.
A paramount advantage of our approach is that one can economize in
the dimension of the state space. A fully nonlinear setup would require an
additional state to keep track over time of the higher-order eﬀects of price
dispersion, as shown by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). Computational
costs would become prohibitive with such an additional state.15
A further advantage of focusing solely on the nonlinearities induced by
the lower bound is that one does not have to parameterize higher order
terms when calibrating the model. This seem important, given the lack of
empirical evidence on this matter.
Finally, the simpler setup implies that our results remain more easily
comparable to the standard linear-quadratic analysis without lower bound
that appears in the literature, as the only diﬀerence consists of imposing
equation (4).
14Technically, this approach is equivalent to linearizing the ﬁrst order conditions of the
nonlinear Ramsey problem around the ﬁrst best steady state except for the non-negativity
constraint for nominal interest rates, that is kept in its original nonlinear form. This is
true because deriving ﬁrst order conditions and linearizing thereafter is equivalent to ﬁrst
linearizing and then taking derivatives.
15Our model has 4 state variables with continuous support and it takes already 39 hours
to obtain convergence on a Pentium 4 with 2.6 GHz.
104 Model Calibration
To assess the quantitative importance of the zero lower bound for monetary
policy, we assign parameter values for the coeﬃcients appearing in equations
(1) to (6) by calibrating the model to the U.S. economy.
Table 1 summarizes our baseline parameterization. The values for α, λ,
and ϕ are taken from table 6.1 in Woodford (2003). The parameters of the
shock processes and the discount factor are estimated using U.S. data for the
period 1983:1-2002:4, following the approach of Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998). Details of the estimation and reasons for the sample period chosen
are given in appendix A.1.
The identiﬁed historical shock series are shown in ﬁgure 3. Mark-up
shocks do not display any signiﬁcant autocorrelation and have a standard
deviation of approximately 0.61% annually.16 R e a lr a t es h o c k s ,h o w e v e r ,a r e
rather persistent. As one would expect, the natural real rate seems to fall
during recessions, e.g., at the beginning of the 1990s and at the start of the
new millennium. The implied annual standard deviation of the natural real
rate, as implicitly deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 8 ) ,i se q u a lt o1.63% annually.17
The robustness of our ﬁndings to various assumptions regarding the pa-
rameterization of the model is considered in section 7.
16This lack of autocorrelation contrasts with Ireland (2002) who uses data starting in
1948:1. Extending our sample back to this date would also lead to highly persistent mark-
up shocks. But our identiﬁcation of shocks requires the absence of structural breaks, so
we restrict attention to the shorter sample period.
17When using instead the period 1979:4-1995:2 as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998),
which includes the volatile years 1980-1982, we ﬁnd an annual standard deviation of 2.57%
for the natural real rate.
115S o l v i n g t h e M o d e l
Due to the presence of an occasionally binding constraint in the model,
analytical results for optimal policy are unavailable. For this reason we
have to rely on numerical methods.
An important complication that arises is that the policymaker’s maxi-
mization problem fails to be recursive, since constraints (2) and (3) involve
forward-looking variables. For this reason we cannot directly resort to dy-
namic programming techniques; these assume transition equations that do
not involve expectation terms. To obtain a dynamic programming formula-
tion we apply the technique of Marcet and Marimon (1998) and reformulate
the policy problem (1)-(7) as follows:
W(µ1
t,µ 2
t,u t,g t)= i n f
(γ1
t,γ2
t)
sup
(yt,πt,it)
©
h(yt,πt,i t,γ1
t,γ2
t,µ 1
t,µ 2
t,u t,g t)
+βEtW(µ1
t+1,µ 2
t+1,u t+1,g t+1)
ª
(9)
s.t.: it ≥− r∗
µ1
t+1 = γ1
t
µ2
t+1 = γ2
t
ut+1 = ρuut + εu,t+1
gt+1 = ρggt + εg,t+1
µ1
0 =0
µ2
0 =0
u0,g 0 given
where
h
¡
y,π,i,γ1,γ2,µ 1,µ 2,u,g
¢
≡− αy2 − π2 + γ1 (π − λy − u) − µ1π
+γ2 (y + ϕi − g) − µ2 1
β (ϕπ + y).
(10)
12Equation (9) is a generalized Bellman equation, requiring maximization with
respect to the controls (yt,πt,i t) and minimization with respect to the La-
grange multipliers
¡
γ1
t,γ2
t
¢
. Marcet and Marimon (1998) call expressions as
equation (9) a recursive saddle point functional equation.
One should note that the reformulated problem (9) is fully recursive,
since the transition equations now involve only lagged state variables. This
problem has, however, two additional state variables (µ1,µ 2), bringing the
total number of state variables up to four. The states (µ1,µ 2) are the lagged
values of the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints (2) and (3), respec-
tively; they can be interpreted as ‘promises’ that have to be kept from past
commitments. A negative value of µ1, e.g., indicates a promise to generate
higher inﬂation rates than what purely forward looking policy would im-
ply. This follows from the expression of the one-period return function h(·)
given in equation (10). Likewise, a negative value of µ2 indicates a promise
to generate values of 1
β(ϕπ + y) higher than what purely forward looking
policy suggests.
Instead of deriving the ﬁrst order conditions of problem (9) and trying
to solve the resulting system of equations, which is the standard approach in
the literature, e.g., Christiano and Fisher (2000), we approximate the value
function that solves the recursive saddle point functional equation (9). It
appears that we are the ﬁrst to actually solve for the saddle point function
of such a recursive problem and doing so has two important advantages.
First, the value function approach allows us to verify whether second
order conditions hold. In particular, we numerically check if the right-hand
side of (9) is a saddlepoint, i.e., a minimum with respect to (γ1
t,γ2
t) and a
maximum with respect to (yt,πt,i t), respectively, at the conjectured opti-
mal policy.18 As is well known, e.g., chapter 14.3 in Silberberg (1990), the
18Technically, we verify the saddle point property by considering a large number of
13saddle point property is a suﬃcient condition for having found a constrained
optimum.
Second, results in Marcet and Marimon (1998) show that, given certain
conditions, the mapping deﬁned by equation (9) is a contraction as for a
standard dynamic programming problem. Therefore, standard value func-
tion iteration methods deliver convergence to the ﬁxed point. Indeed, to
solve for the ﬁxed point we iterate on this generalized Bellman equation
until convergence is achieved. The numerical algorithm used is described in
appendix A.2.
The next sections present the results obtained with our solution ap-
proach.
6 Optimal Policy with Lower Bound
This section describes the optimal policy with a lower bound on nominal
interest rates for the calibration to the U.S. economy shown in table 1. All
variables are expressed as percentage deviations from steady state; both
inﬂation rates and interest rates are transformed into annual rates.
6.1 Optimal Policy Functions
Figure 4 presents the optimal responses of (y,π,i) and the Lagrange mul-
tipliers (γ1,γ2) to both a mark-up shock and a real rate shock.19 The
responses of the Lagrange multipliers are of interest because they represent
simultaneous deviations from the conjectured optimum for (γ
1
t,γ
2
t) and (yt,πt,i t), respec-
tively, at a large number of points in the state space. Due to the recursive structure of the
problem it thereby suﬃces to verify the saddle point property for one-period deviations
only.
19The state variables not shown on the x-axes are set to their (unconditional) average
values. Policies are shown for a range of ±4 unconditional standard deviations of both
the mark-up shock and the real rate shock.
14commitments regarding future inﬂation rates and output levels, as explained
in the previous section. Depicted are the optimal policy responses both for
the case of the zero lower bound being imposed (solid line) and for the case
of interest rates allowed to become negative (dashed line with circles).
The left-hand panel of ﬁgure 4 shows that the optimal response to mark-
up shocks is virtually unaﬀected by the presence of the zero lower bound.20
Independently of whether the bound is imposed or not, a positive mark-up
shock lowers output and leads to a promise of future deﬂation, as indicated
b yt h ep o s i t i v ev a l u eo fγ1. The latter ameliorates the inﬂationary eﬀect
of the shocks through the expectational channel present in equation (2).
To deliver on its promise the policymaker increases nominal interest rates.21
Yet, the required interest rate changes are rather small, implying that mark-
up shocks do not plausibly lead to a binding lower bound.
The situation is quite diﬀerent if we consider the policy response to a
real rate shock, as depicted on the right-hand panel of ﬁgure 4. Without
zero lower bound these shocks do not generate any policy trade-oﬀ:t h er e -
quired real rate can be implemented through appropriate variations in the
nominal rate alone. Once the lower bound is imposed, suﬃciently negative
real rate shocks cause the bound to be binding, so promising future inﬂation
remains the only instrument for implementing reductions in the real rate.
The negative values of γ1 and γ2 reveal that once the lower bound is reached
the policymaker indeed commits to future inﬂation as a substitute for nom-
inal rate cuts. Yet, inﬂation is a costly instrument (in welfare terms) and
20The optimal reaction to mark-up shocks is diﬀerent with or without the bound, but
the diﬀerence is quantiatively small for the calibrated parameter values. We will come
back to this point in section 6.4.
21The sign of the optimal interest rate response, however, depends on the degree of
autocorrelation of the mark-up shocks. In particular, with more persistent shocks nominal
rates would optimally decrease in response to a positive mark-up shock.
15it would be suboptimal to completely undo the output losses generated by
negative real rate shocks. As a result, there is a negative output gap, some
deﬂation, and nominal interest rates are at their lower bound. All these
features are generally associated with a ‘liquidity trap’.
Figure 5 depicts the optimal interest rate response to real rate shocks
in greater detail. This reveals that it is optimal to reduce nominal rates
more aggressively than is the case when nominal rates are allowed to become
negative. Therefore, the lower bound is reached earlier.22 A stronger interest
rate reduction is optimal because the possibility of a binding lower bound in
the future places downward pressure on expected future output and inﬂation,
since these variables become negative once the bound is reached, see the
right-hand panel of ﬁgure 4. The reduced output and inﬂation expectations
amplify the eﬀects of negative real rate shocks in equation (3), thereby
require that the policymaker lowers nominal rates faster.
This ampliﬁcation eﬀect via private sector expectations points towards
an interesting complementarity between policy decisions and private sector
expectations formation that may be of considerable importance for actual
policy making. Suppose, e.g., that agents suddenly assign a larger probabil-
ity to the lower bound being binding in the future. Since this lowers output
and inﬂation expectations, policy would reduce the nominal interest rate
and cause the economy to move into the direction of the expected change.
The existence of possible sunspot ﬂuctuations, however, is an issue that has
to be explored in future work.
22Kato and Nishiyama (2003) found a similar eﬀect with a backward looking AS curve,
which suggests that our result is robust to the introduction of lagged inﬂation terms into
the ‘New Keynesian’ AS curve. Using diﬀerent models, Orphanides and Wieland (2000)
and Reifschneider and Williams (2000) also report more aggressive easing than in the
absence of the zero bound.
166.2 Dynamic Response to Real Rate Shocks
Figure 6 displays the mean response of the economy to real rate shocks of
±3 unconditional standard deviations.23 With our baseline calibration of
table 1 the annual ‘natural’ real rate, i.e., the real interest rate consistent
with the eﬃcient use of productive resources, stands temporarily at +8.39%
and −1.39%, respectively; the interesting case being the one where full use
of productive resources requires a negative real rate.
As argued by Krugman (1998), negative real rates are plausible even
if the marginal product of physical capital remains positive. For instance
agents may require a large equity premium, e.g., historically observed in the
U.S., or the price of physical capital may be expected to decrease.
Figure 6 shows that in response to a negative real rate shock annual inﬂa-
tion rises by about 15 basis points for up to 3 or 4 quarters and then returns
to a value close to zero. Similarly, output increases slightly above potential
from the second quarter and slowly returns to potential. Getting out of a
‘liquidity trap’ induced by negative real-rate shocks, therefore, requires that
the policymaker promises to let future output and inﬂation increase above
zero for a substantial amount of time. The qualitative feature of this ﬁnding
is already reported in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and in a somewhat
diﬀerent way in Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003). Our results tend to clarify,
however, that the required amount of inﬂation and the output boom are
rather modest.
23Since in this nonlinear model certainty equivalence fails, instead of the more familiar
deterministic impulse responses we discuss results in terms of the implied ‘mean dynamics’
in response to shocks. The mean dynamics in this and other graphs are the average
responses computed for 100 thousand stochastic simulations. The initial values for the
other states are set equal to their unconditional average values. Setting them to the
conditional average values consistent with the real rate shock does not make a noticable
diﬀerence.
17One should note that ex-post there would be strong incentives to increase
nominal interest rates earlier than promised, since this would bring both
inﬂation and output closer to their target values. The feasibility of the
optimal policy response, therefore, crucially depends on the policymaker’s
credibility. Wether policymakers can and may want to credibly commit to
such policies is currently subject of debate, e.g.,Orphanides (2003).24
6.3 Frequency of Binding Rates and Welfare Implications
In this section we discuss the frequency with which the zero lower bound
can be expected to bind and welfare implications.
Under optimal policy for the calibration to the U.S. economy the lower
bound binds rather infrequently, namely in about one quarter every 17 years
on average. Moreover, zero nominal interest rates tend to prevail for rather
short periods of time (roughly 1.4 quarters on average). Figure 7 displays the
probability with which the zero bound is binding for n quarters, conditional
on it being binding in quarter one. The likelihood that zero nominal interest
rates persist for more than 4 quarters is merely 1.8%.
Since the lower bound is hit rather infrequently, possible biases for av-
erage output and inﬂation emerging from the nonlinear policy functions are
expected to be small. In fact, our simulations show that for the calibration
at hand there are virtually no average level eﬀects for these variables.25
Finally, as one would expect, the average welfare eﬀects generated by the
existence of a zero lower bound are rather small. Our simulations show that
the additional welfare losses of the zero lower bound are roughly 1% of those
24Interestingly, the Bank of Japan has recently announced explicit macroeconomic con-
ditions that have to be fulﬁlled before it may consider abandoning its current zero interest
rate policy.
25Average output and inﬂation deviate less than 0.01% from their steady state values.
18generated by the stickiness of prices alone.26 Since the zero lower bound is
reached rather infrequently, the conditional welfare losses associated with
being at the lower bound can nevertheless be quite substantial.
6.4 Global Implications of Binding Shocks
This section reports a qualitatively new ﬁnding that stems from the presence
of binding negative real rate shocks. It turns out that binding shocks alter
the optimal policy response to non-binding shocks, i.e., positive real rate
shocks and mark-up shocks of both signs. In this sense, the existence of
a lower bound has global implications on the shape of the optimal policy
functions.
For the baseline parameterization of the U.S. economy given in table
1, however, these global eﬀects are quite weak, since the lower bound binds
rather infrequently. To illustrate the global eﬀects, in this section we assume
that the variance σ2
g of the innovations εg,t is threefold that implied by the
baseline calibration.27
Figure 8 illustrates the mean response of the real rate to a ±3 standard
deviation real rate shock under optimal policy. The upper panel shows
the case with lower bound and the lower panel depicts the case without
bound. While in the latter case the policy reaction is perfectly symmetric,
imposing the bound creates a sizeable asymmetry: the real rate reduction in
26In this paper we compute welfare losses by taking one thousand random draws of
the initial states (u0,g 0,µ
1
0,µ
2
0) from their stationary distributions (under optimal policy
with and without lower bound) and then evaluate the corresponding welfare losses in the
subsequent one thousand periods.
27This value is roughly consistent with the estimated variability of real rate shocks in the
period 1979:4-1995:2, i.e., the time span considered by Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).
The unconditional variance of the real rate shocks for 1979:4-1995:2 is about 2.5-fold that
for the period 1983:1-2002:4.
19response to a negative shock is much weaker than the corresponding increase
in response to a positive shock.28
Equation (3), however, implies that the policymaker is unable to aﬀect
the average real rate in any stationary equilibrium.29 Therefore, the less
strong real rate decrease for a binding real rate shock has to be compensated
with a less strong real rate increase (or a stronger real rate decrease) in
response to other shocks. A close look at ﬁgure 8 reveals that this is indeed
t h ec a s e :t h er e a lr a t ei n c r e a s ew i t ht he lower bound falls slightly short of
the one implemented without bound.
Moreover, it is optimal to undo the asymmetry by trading-oﬀ across
all shocks, e.g., also across mark-up shocks. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 9
which plots the economy’s mean response to ±3 standard deviation mark-
up shocks. The left-hand panel illustrates the response when the zero lower
bound is imposed and the right-hand panel depicts the case without bound.
Clearly, the mean reactions change considerably once the lower bound is
imposed. Real rates are now lowered more (increased less) in response to
negative (positive) mark-up shocks. This is the case even though mark-up
shocks do not lead to a binding lower bound.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
We now analyze the robustness of our ﬁndings to a number of variations in
our baseline calibration. Particular attention is given to the sensitivity of
the results to changes in the parameterization of the shock processes.
28With negative shocks expected inﬂation has to be used to reduce the real interest rate
which is a costly instrument in welfare terms.
29This can be seen by taking unconditional expectations of equation (3), imposing sta-
tionarity, and noting that E[gt]=0 .
207.1 More Variable Shocks
We estimated the shock processes using data for a time period that most
economists would consider to be relatively ‘calm’ especially when confronted
with the more ‘turbulent’ 1960s and 1970s. Since one cannot exclude that
more ‘turbulent’ times might lie ahead, it seems to be of interest to study
the implications of optimal policy with more variable mark-up and real rate
shocks. In this regard, this section considers the sensitivity of our ﬁndings
to an increase of the shock variances σ2
u and σ2
g above the values in table 1.
Increasing the variance of mark-up shocks we ﬁnd that the results are
remarkably stable. This holds even if setting the variance of σ2
u threefold
above its estimated value. Average output and (annual) inﬂation are vir-
tually unaﬀected. Moreover, zero nominal rates still occur with the same
frequency and persistence as for the baseline parameterization of table 1.
The picture changes somewhat increasing the variance of real rate shocks.
While average output remains virtually unaﬀected, average inﬂation and the
average frequency and persistence of zero nominal rates do change, albeit
to diﬀerent extents. This is illustrated in the ﬁrst three panels of ﬁgure 10,
that show the implications of increasing the variance of real rate shocks up
to threefold above that of the baseline calibration.30 Average inﬂation and
the average persistence of zero nominal rates change only in minor ways.
Instead, as real rate shocks become more variable, zero nominal rates occur
much more often.
Moreover, as can be observed in the lowest panel of ﬁgure 10, the addi-
tional welfare losses generated by the zero lower bound increase markedly
30This value is roughly consistent with the estimated variability of real rate shocks in the
period 1979:4-1995:2, i.e., the time span considered by Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).
The unconditional variance of the real rate shocks for 1979:4-1995:2 is about 2.5-fold that
for the period 1983:1-2002:4.
21with the variance of the real rate shock process. While for the baseline cali-
bration the additional average losses of the zero lower bound over and above
those generated by the stickiness of prices is in the order of 1%, once the
variance of real rate innovations is threefold the additional losses surge to
roughly 33%. This shows that the welfare eﬀects of the zero lower bound
are more sensitive to the variance of the assumed real rate process.
One should note that the eﬀects of the variability of shocks on the average
level of output and inﬂation diﬀer considerably from those reported in earlier
contributions. Uhlig (2000), e.g., reports negative level eﬀects for both vari-
ables when analyzing optimal policy in a backward-looking model. Clearly,
the gains from promising positive values of future output and inﬂation can-
not show up in a backward-looking model. Similarly, Coenen, Orphanides
and Wieland (2004) report negative level eﬀects for a forward-looking model
considering Taylor-type interest rate rules, rather than optimal policy as in
this paper. Moreover, unlike suggested by Summers (1991), our results do
not justify that it is necessary to target positive inﬂation rates so as to
safeguard the economy against hitting the zero lower bound.
7.2 Lower Interest Rate Elasticity of Output
Our benchmark calibration of table 1 assumes an interest rate elasticity
of output of ϕ =6 .25, which seems to lie on the high side for plausible
estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.31 Therefore, we
also consider the case ϕ =1that corresponds to log utility in consumption,
and constitutes the usual benchmark parameterization in the real business
cycle literature. Table 2 presents the parameters values implied by assuming
ϕ =1instead of ϕ =6 .25. Note that the values of λ and α are also
31As argued by Woodford (2003), a high elasticity value may capture non-modeled
interest-rate-sensitive investment demand.
22changed, as they depend on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.32
To estimate the shock processes, we follow the same procedure as for the
baseline calibration. Details of the estimation are given in appendix A.3.
Overall, our ﬁndings seem robust to the change in the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. In particular, the level eﬀects on average output
and inﬂation remain negligible. Moreover, required inﬂa t i o ni nr e s p o n s et o
a negative 3 standard deviation real rate shock is still in the order of 15
basis points annually. Even more importantly, the additional welfare losses
generated by the zero bound are rather small and in the order of less than
one-half percent of the losses generated by the stickiness of prices alone.
Respect to the baseline, however, the lower bound is binding more fre-
quently, namely in about one quarter every 5 years on average. Binding
real rate shocks occur more often because the variance of the real rate shock
process implied by the parameterization in table 2 is about 45% higher than
in our baseline.33 However, binding shocks now generate lower additional
welfare losses: the steeper slope λ of the Phillips curve implies that inﬂation
reacts more strongly to output. As a result, the required amount of inﬂation
can be generated with less positive output gaps, implying lower additional
welfare losses.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we determine optimal monetary policy under commitment tak-
ing directly into account the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and
assess its quantitative importance for the U.S. economy. One of the main
ﬁndings is that, given the historical properties of the estimated shock pro-
32See equations (2.19) and (2.22) in chapter 6 of Woodford (2003).
33Mark-up shocks also play a less marginal role, a negative shock in the order of 4
standard deviations now leads to a binding lower bound.
23cesses for the U.S. economy, the zero lower bound seems neither to impose
large constraints on optimal monetary policy nor to generate large addi-
tional welfare losses. Furthermore, we show that the existence of the zero
lower bound might require to lower nominal interest rates more aggressively
in response to adverse shocks than what is suggested instead by a model
without lower bound.
Our ﬁndings raise a number of further issues. First, the omission of ﬁscal
policy clearly constitutes a shortcoming; the study of the potential role of
ﬁscal policy in ameliorating adverse welfare eﬀects entailed by the lower
bound seems to be of interest. Second, given the widespread belief among
academics and practitioners that lagged inﬂation is a major determinant of
inﬂation, an issue that should be addressed is the robustness of our ﬁndings
to the introduction of lagged inﬂa t i o ni nt h eP h i l l i p sc u r v e .
Finally, the central bank’s credibility is key to our results. The use of
expected inﬂation is unavailable to a discretionary policymaker, as there is
no incentive to implement promised inﬂation ex-post. The zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates, therefore, may generate signiﬁcant additional wel-
fare losses under discretionary policy. We explore this issue in a companion
paper, see Adam and Billi (2003).
AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Identiﬁcation of historical shocks (baseline calibration)
To identify the historical shock processes we apply the procedure of Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1998). In particular, we ﬁrst construct output and
inﬂation expectations by estimating expectation functions from the data.
We then plug these expectations along with actual values of the output gap
and inﬂation into equations (2) and (3), and identify the shocks ut and gt
24with the equation residuals.
We measure the output gap by linearly detrended log real GDP, and
inﬂation by the log quarterly diﬀerence of the implicit deﬂator.34 Using
quadratically detrended GDP or HP(1600)-ﬁltered GDP leaves the esti-
mated parameters of the shock processes virtually unchanged. Detrended
output is depicted in ﬁgure 1. For the interest rate we use the quarterly
average of the fed funds rate in deviation from the average real rate for
the whole sample, which is approximately equal to 3.5% (in annual terms).
Based on this latter estimate we can set the quarterly discount factor as
s h o w ni nt a b l e1 .
The expectation terms in equations (2) and (3) are constructed from
the predictions of an unconstrained VAR in output, inﬂation, and the fed
funds rate with three lags. Estimating expectation functions in such a way
is justiﬁed as long as there are no structural breaks in the economy. Since
our sample period, 1983:1-2002:4, starts after the disinﬂation policy under
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, monetary policy is expected to
have been reasonably stable, see Clarida et al. (2000). A VAR lag order
selection test based on the Akaike information criterion for a maximum of
6 lags suggests the inclusion of 3 lags. A Wald lag exclusion test indicates
that the third lags are jointly signiﬁcant at the 2% level. The correlations of
the VAR residuals are depicted in ﬁgure 2. Substituting the expectations in
equations (2) and (3) with the VAR predictions one can identify the shocks
ut and gt. The implied shock series are shown in ﬁgure 3.
Fitting univariate AR(1) processes to these shocks delivers the following
34The data is taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis: www.bea.gov.
25OLS estimates:
ρu =0 .129 (0.113)
ρg =0 .919 (0.050)
σu =0 .153
σg =1 .091
where numbers in brackets indicate standard errors. A univariate AR(1)
describes the shock processes ut and gt quite well. In particular, there is no
signiﬁcant autocorrelation left in the innovations εi,t (i = u,g).M o r e o v e r ,
when estimating AR(2) processes the additional lags remain insigniﬁcant.
The estimated value of ρu is insigniﬁcant at conventional signiﬁcance
levels. For this reason we set ρu =0and let the standard deviation of
the innovations εu,t match the standard deviation of the identiﬁed mark-up
shocks, which is approximately equal to 0.61% annually.
Although real rate shocks seem quite persistent, the persistence drops
considerably once one uses actual future values to identify output and in-
ﬂation expectations in equations (2) and (3), which amounts to assuming
perfect foresight. The estimated autoregressive coeﬃcient for the real rate
shocks then drops to ρg =0 .794, indicating that better forecasts than our
simple VAR-predictions would most likely lead to a reduction in the esti-
mated persistence. Moreover, when using VAR-predictions but considering
the period 1979:4-1995:2, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), the point
estimate falls to ρg =0 .827. For these reasons we set ρg =0 .8 in our calibra-
tion.35 The standard deviation σg of the innovations εg,t in table 1 equates
the unconditional standard deviation of the calibrated real shock process to
the standard deviation of the identiﬁed shock values.
35This value cannot be rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance level when using estimates based
on the VAR-expectations. In an earlier version of this paper, which is available upon
request, we used instead the point estimates for ρu and ρg.
26A.2 Numerical algorithm
We use the collocation method to solve for the value function and the optimal
policy functions in problem (9).36 In particular, one discretizes the state
space S ⊂ R4 into a set of N collocation nodes ℵ = {sn|n =1 ,...,N} where
sn ∈ S. One then interpolates the value function over these collocation nodes
by choosing basis coeﬃcients cn (n =1 ,...,N) such that
W(sn)=
X
n=1,...,N
cnζ(sn) (11)
at each node sn ∈ℵ ,w h e r eζ(·) is a four dimensional cubic spline function.
Equation (11) is an approximation to the left-hand side of (9).
To evaluate the right-hand side of (9) one has to approximate the ex-
pected value EW(t(sn,x 1,x 2,ε)),w h e r et(·) denotes the state transition
function, x1 =( γ1,γ2) and x2 =( y,π,i) are the vectors of controls, and
ε =( εu,εg) are the multivariate normal innovations of the shock processes.
Assuming normality, the expected value function can be approximated by
Gaussian-Hermite quadrature, which involves discretizing the shock distri-
bution into a set of quadrature nodes εh and associated probability weights
ωh (h =1 ,...,M).37
Substituting the collocation equation (11) for the value function W(t(sn,x 1,x 2,ε)),
t h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 9 ) ,RHSc(·), can be approximated as
RHSc(sn)=i n f
x1
sup
x2
{h(sn,x 1,x 2) (12)
+β
X
i=1,...,M
X
j=1,...,N
ωicjζj(t(sn,x 1,x 2,εi))}
at each node sn ∈ℵ . The maximization/minimization problem (12) can
be implemented using standard Newton methods, taking into account that
36See chapter 11 in Judd (1998) and chapters 6 and 9 in Miranda and Fackler (2002)
for more detailed expositions.
37See chapter 7 in Judd (1998) for details.
27i ≥− r∗. This delivers RHSc(·) and the policy functions x1c(·) and x2c(·)
at the collocation nodes.
Using the collocation technique one can then approximate RHSc(·) by
a new set of basis coeﬃcients c0
n (n =1 ,...,N) such that
RHSc(sn)=
X
n=1,...,N
c0
nζ(sn) (13)
at each node sn ∈ℵ .
Equations (11), (12), and (13) together deﬁne the iteration
c → Φ(c) (14)
where c is the initial vector of basis coeﬃcients in (11) and Φ(c) the vector
of basis coeﬃcient c0 in (13). The ﬁxed point of equation (9) satisﬁes c∗ =
Φ(c∗).
To solve for this ﬁxed point one proceeds as follows:
Step 1 Choose the degree of approximation N and M and appropriate collo-
cation and quadrature nodes. Guess an initial basis coeﬃcient vector
c0.
Step 2 Iterate on equation (14) and update the basis function coeﬃcient vec-
tor ck to ck+1.
Step 3 Stop and set c∗ = ck+1 if
¯ ¯ck+1 − ck¯ ¯
max < τ,w h e r eτ > 0 is a tolerance
level and |·|max denotes the maximum absolute norm. Otherwise go
back to step 2.
Once the (approximate) ﬁxed point c∗ has been found, one needs to
assess the accuracy of the solution. Deﬁne the residual function
Rc∗(s)=RHSc∗(s) −
X
n=1,...,N
c∗
nζ(s)
28where s ∈ℵ ε and ℵε is a grid of nodes for which ℵε ∩ℵ= ∅. Then compute
the maximum absolute approximation error
eabs =m a x
s∈ℵε |Rc∗(s)|
and the maximum absolute relative error
erel =m a x
s∈ℵε
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Rc∗(s)/


X
n=1,...,N
c∗
nζ(s)


¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
For the baseline parameterization we set N =6 8 7 5and M =9 ,w i t h
relatively more nodes placed into the area of the state space where the
policy functions display kinks. The support of the discretization is chosen
so as to cover ±4 unconditional standard deviations of the exogenous states
u and g, and to insure that in a long simulation of one million periods
all state values fall inside the chosen support for µ1 and µ2. Since the
latter can only be veriﬁed ex-post, i.e., after having obtained the solution,
some experimentation is necessary to achieve this. Our initial guess for c0
is consistent with the solution of the problem without lower bound. The
tolerance level is set to τ =1 .49 · 10−8, i.e., the square root of machine
precision. Convergence is reached after about 39 hours on a Pentium IV
with 2.6 GHz. The approximation errors are eabs =0 .0021 and erel =0 .0027,
where ℵε contained more than 75000 nodes.
A.3 Identiﬁcation of historical shocks (RBC calibration)
We re-estimated the shock processes using the parameters from table 2 to-
gether with VAR-based expectations, following the procedure described in
appendix A.1. The autocorrelation coeﬃcient for the mark-up shocks now
turns out to be statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Therefore, in table 2
we set ρu equal to its point estimate. The point estimate (standard devia-
tion) of the autocorrelation of the real rate shocks is now ρg =0 .882 (0.059).
29Since we still cannot reject ρg =0 .8 at conventional signiﬁcance levels, we
keep this value of the baseline parameterization. As before, the standard
deviation σg of the innovation εg,t is chosen so as to match the standard
deviation of the estimated real rate shocks.
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34Parameter Economic interpretation Assigned value
β quarterly discount factor
³
1+3.5%
4
´−1
≈ 0.9913
α weight on output in the loss function 0.048
42 =0 .003
λ slope of the Phillips curve 0.024
ϕ real rate elasticity of output 6.25
ρu AR-coeﬃcient mark-up shocks 0
ρg AR-coeﬃcient real rate shocks 0.8
σu s.d. mark-up shock innovations (quarterly %) 0.154
σg s.d. real rate shock innovations (quarterly %) 1.524
Table 1: Parameter values (baseline calibration)
Parameter Economic interpretation Assigned value
β quarterly discount factor
³
1+3.5%
4
´−1
≈ 0.9913
α weight on output in the loss function 0.007
λ slope of the AS curve 0.057
ϕ real rate elasticity of output 1
ρu AR-coeﬃcient mark-up shocks 0.36
ρg AR-coeﬃcient real rate shocks 0.8
σu s.d. mark-up shock innovations (quarterly %) 0.171
σg s.d. real rate shock innovations (quarterly %) 0.294
Table 2: Parameter values (RBC calibration)
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Figure 1: Detrended U.S. output
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Figure 2: Residual autocorrelations with 2 s.d. error bounds for an unre-
stricted VAR in GDP, inﬂation, and fed funds rate.
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Figure 3: Identiﬁed shock processes
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Figure 4: Optimal policy responses (baseline calibration)
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Figure 5: More aggressive easing with lower bound (baseline calibration)
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Figure 6: Mean response to ±3 s.d. real rate shocks (baseline calibration)
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Figure 7: Persistence of zero interest rates (baseline calibration)
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Figure 8: Asymmetric real rate response with lower bound (3-fold variance
of real rate shocks)
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Figure 9: Mean response to ±3 s.d. mark-up shock (3-fold variance of real
rate shocks)
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Figure 10: Sensitivity to the variance of real rate shocks
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